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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 80 Pension Trust Fund 
and Westchester Teamsters Pension Fund (“the Funds”) 
brought a putative securities fraud class action against Hertz 
Global Holdings, Inc. (“Hertz” or “the Company”) and 
several of its current and former executives for violating §§ 
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as 
amended by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (“PSLRA”), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.  
The Funds appeal the District Court’s dismissal of their fourth 
amended complaint (“FAC”) for failure to plead a strong 






 A. Allegations in the FAC1 
 
 The Funds allege that Hertz, through its former Chief 
Executive Officer Mark Frissora, former Chief Financial 
Officer Elyse Douglas, and former Senior Vice President of 
Finance and Corporate Controller Jatindar Kapur 
(collectively, the “Individual Defendants”)2 violated the 
securities laws by making materially false and misleading 
statements concerning the Company’s financial results, 
internal controls, and future earnings projections.  The Funds’ 
securities fraud allegations rely on a financial restatement 
Hertz issued with its fiscal year 2014 Form 10-K (“the 
Restatement”).  In it the Company admitted that “an 
inconsistent and sometimes inappropriate tone at the top was 
present under the then existing senior management” and that 
the tone “resulted in an environment which in some instances 
may have led to inappropriate accounting decisions and the 
failure to disclose information critical to … effective 
review[.]”  (App. at 609.)  
                                              
 1  The facts contained in this section come from 
allegations in the FAC, documents the FAC referenced or 
relied upon, and matters of which we may take judicial 
notice.  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 
308, 322 (2007). 
 
 2  The FAC also named as defendants Hertz’s former 
interim CFO David Rosenberg and its current CFO Thomas 
Kennedy, but the Funds do not appeal the District Court’s 




 The Restatement corrected material errors to Hertz’s 
2011, 2012, and 2013 financial statements that, cumulatively, 
“[overstated] its pre-tax income ... by $215 million and its net 
income … by $132 million.”  (App. at 467.)  Those errors 
stemmed from misstatements relating to fifteen distinct 
accounting categories, causing Hertz to make twenty separate 
accounting adjustments to its previous financial statements.  
Those accounting errors were, in turn, a result of “four 
categories of material weaknesses in [Hertz’s] internal control 
over financial reporting”: control environment, risk 
assessment, information and communication, and monitoring.  
(App. at 609.) 
 
 As the Individual Defendants were overseeing Hertz’s 
accounting department, which was having to deal with the 
“inappropriate tone” they set, the Company continued to 
report “record” financial results and publish optimistic 
anticipated future earnings.  That information was 
disseminated through press releases; public statements made 
by Frissora and Douglas to analysts and investors during 
phone calls and industry conferences; and SEC filings.  
Moreover, Hertz’s SEC filings included Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(“SOX”) certifications signed by Company executives – 
including the Individual Defendants – attesting to the 
accuracy of the information contained in the relevant filings 
and to the sufficiency of the Company’s internal accounting 
controls.  Throughout much of 2013 and early 2014, the 
defendants relied on Hertz’s financial results from fiscal years 
2012 and 2013 to tout the Company’s healthy financial 
position and to project a rosy financial outlook for the future.  
As the Restatement made clear, however, those financial 
results were materially inaccurate; Hertz’s projections of 
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future earnings were misguided; and the Company’s internal 
controls throughout the relevant period were deficient. 
 
 The accounting problems permeating Hertz’s 
accounting department began incrementally coming to public 
attention in late 2013, culminating in the Restatement issued 
on July 16, 2015.  Hertz began revealing its problems in 
September 2013, when it walked back its projected earnings 
for fiscal year 2013.  That announcement came just days after 
Hertz abruptly announced Douglas’s resignation for “personal 
reasons[.]”  (App. at 516.)  Next, in March 2014, Hertz 
disclosed through an SEC filing that it would have to delay 
filing its fiscal year 2013 Form 10-K because “it [had] 
identified certain adjustments relating to prior periods which 
… require[d] the Company to revise certain of its previously 
issued financial statements.”  (App. at 550.)  Nonetheless, 
later that same month, the defendants continued to tout 
Hertz’s “record results” and to publish optimistic 
anticipations of future earnings.  As Hertz continued to 
emphasize its “record results,” it also began to disclose that it 
had identified tens of millions of dollars in accounting errors 
relating to its 2011 and 2012 financial statements.  In March 
2014, however, Hertz still publicly classified those errors as 
non-material misstatements.  About one month after revealing 
those errors, Hertz announced Kapur’s resignation for 
“personal reasons.”  (App. at 517.) 
 
 By June 2014, Hertz had again delayed required SEC 
filings, publicly announced that the Company would have to 
restate its financial statements for 2011, and disclosed that it 
would also need to correct errors in its 2012 and 2013 
financial statements that could potentially result in the need to 
issue restatements for those years as well.  Hertz also initiated 
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two internal investigations that month, one to review the 
Company’s “financial records for fiscal years 2011, 2012, and 
2013,” and the other to assess the internal controls the 
Company had in place during prior financial reporting 
periods.  (App. at 608.)  Hertz announced Frissora’s 
resignation for “personal reasons” several months later, in 
September 2014.  (App. at 518.) 
 
 Hertz slowly revealed the findings of its internal 
investigations to the public between August 2014 and July 
2015 through periodic SEC filings.  Those filings discussed 
Hertz’s withdrawal of its previously announced projections 
for future earnings and disclosed that the cumulative effect of 
the identified accounting errors was material, requiring full 
restatements for fiscal years 2011, 2012, and 2013.  Each 
subsequent SEC filing revised upward the magnitude of the 
accounting errors on Hertz’s prior financial statements.  
Based on Hertz’s financial disclosures, the Funds allege that 
Hertz had overstated its net income and pre-tax income by, 
respectively, $28.7 million (17.19%) and $69.3 million 
(27.18%) in 2011; $59.1 million (32.12%) and $85.6 million 
(23.45%) in 2012; and $44.2 million (14.64%) and $60.1 
million (9.97%) in 2013.   
 
 In addition to the allegations of financial reporting 
fraud, the Funds also allege that during the relevant class 
period – February 14, 2013, to July 16, 2015 – Douglas and 
Kapur sold large amounts of their Hertz stock holdings, that 
those trades were out of line with those individuals’ prior 
trading practices, and that those trades resulted in Douglas 
and Kapur profiting in an amount in excess of their respective 




 B. Procedural History 
  
 The Funds filed the FAC in March 2016, 
approximately seven-and-a-half months after Hertz issued the 
Restatement and over twenty-seven months after they first 
initiated this lawsuit.  The FAC contains numerous 
allegations based primarily on the admissions contained in the 
Restatement, which the District Court reviewed carefully.  In 
the end, however, the Court concluded that the FAC failed to 
adequately plead a strong inference of scienter.  The Court 
stated: 
 
Even giving [the Funds] every reasonable 
inference, their allegations amount to the 
following: Hertz discovered serious accounting 
problems, traced those problems back to a 
corporate mismanagement (and possibly even 
negligent conduct), publicly disclosed those 
problems, and updated the public every time it 
realized the problem was worse than previously 
disclosed.  The FAC carefully explains how the 
accounting problems were caused by the 
Individual Defendants, but it never provides a 
cogent and compelling explanation how those 
defendants were aware that they caused those 
problems before Hertz discovered them.  For 
those reasons, their claims fail. 
(App. at 54.)  That conclusion led to the dismissal of the 





 A. Legal Standard for Pleading Securities  
  Fraud 
 
 To adequately allege a § 10(b) securities fraud claim, a 
plaintiff must plead “(1) a material misrepresentation or 
omission, (2) scienter, (3) a connection between the 
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a 
security, (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission, 
(5) economic loss, and (6) loss causation.”  City of Edinburgh 
Council v. Pfizer, Inc., 754 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 2014).  A 
plaintiff must also meet the heightened pleading standards 
imposed by the PSLRA.  Institutional Inv’rs Grp. v. Avaya, 
Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 252 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 
 To adequately plead scienter under the PSLRA, a 
plaintiff must “state with particularity facts giving rise to a 
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required 
state of mind,” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A), which we have 
described as one “embracing [an] intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud,” either knowingly or recklessly.  
Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d at 252 (citation omitted).  A complaint 
adequately pleads a strong inference of scienter “only if a 
reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter 
                                              
 3  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.  We have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a 
district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to meet the 
pleading requirements of the PSLRA and over a district 
court’s interpretation of the federal securities laws.  Winer 
Family Tr. v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 325 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference 
one could draw from the facts alleged.”  Tellabs, Inc. v. 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007).  But a 
plaintiff does not need to come forward with “smoking-gun” 
evidence to meet the PSLRA’s pleading requirements.  Id.  
Rather, in conducting the scienter analysis, courts must 
analyze the complaint holistically to determine whether its 
allegations, “taken collectively, give rise to a strong inference 
of scienter, not whether any individual allegation, scrutinized 
in isolation, meets that standard.”  Id. at 323. 
 
 B. The District Court Applied Tellabs   
  Appropriately. 
 
 The Funds argue that the District Court erred when it 
concluded that the FAC’s allegations did not give rise to a 
strong inference of scienter.  They contend that the Court 
failed to adhere to the interpretive framework for assessing 
scienter set forth by the Supreme Court in Tellabs, Inc. v. 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd, and that, when analyzed 
appropriately, the FAC’s allegations give an inference of 
scienter that is “at least as compelling as any opposing 
inference[.]”  551 U.S. at 324.  More particularly, the Funds 
argue that the Court deviated from the Tellabs framework in 
three material ways: by failing to draw inferences favorable to 
them, by requiring “smoking-gun” evidence to adequately 
plead scienter, and by failing to consider the FAC’s 
allegations holistically.  Those contentions do not persuade 
us. 
 
 First, the District Court did not stray from the Tellabs 
framework by failing to make inferences only in the Funds’ 
favor.  Rather, it adhered to Tellabs’s explicit instruction to 
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conduct a comparative analysis by considering both 
inferences favorable to the Funds as well as “plausible, 
nonculpable explanations for the defendant’s conduct[.]”  Id. 
at 324.  That the District Court disagreed with the Funds’ 
preferred inferences is not a violation of the Tellabs 
framework. 
 
 Second, the Court did not effectively require the Funds 
to submit “smoking-gun” evidence to survive the defendants’ 
motions to dismiss.  It simply emphasized that the FAC 
lacked allegations connecting the fact that Hertz had 
“accounting problems … caused by the Individual 
Defendants” with an inference that “those defendants were 
aware that they caused those problems[.]”  (App. at 54.)  In 
other words, the Court only required the Funds to plead 
factual allegations supporting a cogent inference that the 
Individual Defendants knowingly made material 
misstatements, or that they made material misstatements with 
reckless disregard for the truth of those statements.  That the 
Funds could not plead such allegations does not mean that the 
District Court effectively required them to submit “smoking-
gun” evidence. 
 
 Finally, the District Court conducted the holistic 
review of the FAC that Tellabs requires.  Although the Court 
assessed each category of the Funds’ scienter allegations 
independently, it concluded its analysis in a separately headed 
sub-section – “Failure to Plead a Strong Inference of 
Scienter” – that stated in part: 
 
In sum, [the Funds] have failed to plead a strong 




The strongest inference of scienter comes from 
the Restatement.  However, the Restatement is 
not enough by itself, so Plaintiffs had to tip the 
inferential scale with the four other categories 
of allegations.  But, as explained, those 
categories do not strengthen the inference of 
knowledge or recklessness. 
(App. at 54.)  We have explicitly approved of scienter 
analyses that assess individual categories of scienter 
allegations individually when it is clear, as it is here, that a 
district court ultimately considered the allegations as a whole.  
See OFI Asset Mgmt. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber, 834 F.3d 481, 
493 (3d Cir. 2016) (concluding that just because a court is 
“thorough in explaining why it found scienter lacking as to 
each asserted misrepresentation does not suggest that it did 
not consider the allegations as a whole”).  In fact, we have 
adopted that interpretive approach ourselves when conducting 
a scienter analysis pursuant to the PSLRA.  See Avaya, Inc., 
564 F.3d at 280 (“Although we have discussed each of the 
alleged facts bearing on defendants’ scienter one at a time, we 
have heeded Tellabs’s command to evaluate [the plaintiffs’] 
allegations collectively rather than individually.”). 
 
 C. The FAC Does Not Plead a Strong Inference  
  of Scienter. 
 
 The Funds argue that the Restatement’s admission that 
Frissora and other Hertz senior management maintained an 
“inappropriate tone at the top,” when viewed in conjunction 
with the FAC’s scienter allegations, provides an inference of 
scienter that is “at least as compelling as any opposing 
[nonculpable] inference[.]”  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324.  To 
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make that argument, the Funds depend – as they did in the 
District Court – on five categories of scienter allegations: (1) 
the size and scope of the Restatement, (2) Hertz’s admission 
of material weaknesses in its internal controls, (3) signed 
SOX certifications accompanying materially false SEC 
filings, (4) Hertz’s replacement of upper management, and (5) 
insider trading activity by Douglas and Kapur.  Like the 
District Court, we will assess each category of allegations 
individually before analyzing the FAC’s allegations as a 
whole.  We ultimately agree with the District Court that the 
FAC’s allegations do not give rise to a strong inference of 
scienter. 
 
  1. Size and Scope of the Restatement 
 
 The size and scope of a company’s restatement of prior 
financial statements is one factor that courts consider when 
conducting a scienter analysis.  PR Diamonds, Inc. v. 
Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 685 (6th Cir. 2004); In re BISYS Sec. 
Litig., 397 F. Supp. 2d 430, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re 
Stonepath Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 397 F. Supp. 2d 575, 587 
(E.D. Pa. 2005).  A company’s admission even to significant 
accounting errors, however, “is insufficient by itself to give 
rise to a strong inference of scienter.”  Podraza v. Whiting, 
790 F.3d 828, 838 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 
 The inferential force of a restatement is lessened when 
the plaintiff fails to plead particularized allegations of 
fraudulent intent.  Id. at 837; see also Dobina v. Weatherford 
Int’l Ltd., 909 F. Supp. 2d 228, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(explaining that the magnitude of a restatement does not give 
rise to a strong inference of scienter if there are no allegations 
“that the … defendants had any contemporaneous basis to 
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believe that the information they related was incorrect”).  As 
the District Court observed, the FAC fails to sufficiently 
allege either that the Individual Defendants knowingly caused 
Hertz’s accounting personnel to engage in accounting fraud 
or that the accounting improprieties were so obvious that the 
Individual Defendants must have known about them when 
reporting Hertz’s financial results to the public.  The Court 
logically concluded that, although the Restatement was 
substantial, any inference of scienter was “circumscribed by” 
the fact that the accounting errors were spread across myriad 
accounting categories.  (App. at 39.) 
 
 Moreover, the size of the Restatement was not 
sufficiently drastic to give rise to a strong inference of 
scienter absent particularized allegations of fraudulent intent.  
The Restatement revealed that Hertz’s financial statements 
from 2011 to 2013 cumulatively overstated its net income by 
$132 million (20.23%) and its pre-tax income by $215 
million (17.58%).  When broken down by year, the 
Restatement shows that Hertz overstated those income 
categories by between 9.97% and 32.12%.  Courts that have 
looked to the magnitude of a financial restatement to 
strengthen the inference of scienter have been faced with 
restatements significantly more drastic than what we have 
here.  See, e.g., Fresno Cty. Empl. Ret. Ass’nv. comScore, 
Inc., 268 F. Supp. 3d 526, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (inferring 
scienter when restatement wrote off 100% of an entire 
accounting category); In re Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings, 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 324 F. Supp. 2d 474, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(inferring scienter where restatement “transformed … a 
company with retained earnings of approximately $185 
million to a company with an accumulated deficit of 
approximately $178 million”); In re MicroStrategy, Inc. Sec. 
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Litig., 115 F. Supp. 2d 620, 635-36 (E.D. Va. 2000) (inferring 
scienter, in part, because a restatement revealed an issuer had 
erroneously been reporting net income instead of net losses); 
cf. Webb v. Solarcity Corp., 884 F.3d 844, 858 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(explaining that restatement disclosing that net income was 
overstated by 15% to 67% per quarter did not give rise to 
strong inference of scienter in the absence of other 
compelling allegations supporting scienter). 
 
 Accordingly, the size and scope of the changes 
highlighted in the Restatement provide at most some 
inference of scienter but not a strong inference. 
 
  2. Hertz’s Admission of Material   
   Weaknesses in Its Internal Controls 
 
 The Funds argue that the District Court erred by 
interpreting the Restatement’s admission of an “inappropriate 
tone at the top” to be an admission of “mismanagement,” as 
opposed to an admission of “misconduct.”  (Opening Br. at 
28.)  We agree with the District Court that the Restatement’s 
admissions are more plausibly interpreted as admissions of 
mismanagement, not of affirmative misconduct on the part of 
the Individual Defendants.  We reach that conclusion for two 
reasons.  First, the Restatement itself explicitly links the 
phrase “inappropriate tone at the top” to Frissora’s 
management style.  For example, after first introducing that 
phrase, the Restatement continues, “[i]n particular, 
[Frissora’s] management style and temperament created a 
pressurized operating environment at the Company, where 
challenging targets were set and achieving those targets was a 
key performance expectation.”  (App. at 609.)  Second, the 
more plausible inference from the Restatement’s use of the 
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word “tone” is that the Restatement is referring to 
management style and not to misconduct.  The word “tone,” 
after all, means a “style or manner of expression in speaking 
or writing[.]”  Tone, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2002).4 
 
 At most, then, the FAC has pleaded that the Individual 
Defendants presided over a poorly managed corporation and 
that the mismanagement created an environment in which 
improper accounting practices flourished.  But we have long 
held “that an allegation of mismanagement on the part of a 
                                              
 4  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit has similarly rejected an argument that an admission 
that a defendant company’s “former senior management was 
‘incompeten[t]’ and otherwise contributed to [a] deficient 
‘tone at the top’” essentially equated to an admission of “an 
environment which encourage[d] accounting fraud.”  Matrix 
Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 
183 (4th Cir. 2009).  It reasoned that admissions that a 
“deficient ‘tone at the top’” existed “fail[ed] to suggest that 
defendants intentionally created an environment conducive to 
accounting fraud” and explained that the company had 
“simply admit[ted] that such an environment existed,” which 
“fail[ed] to suggest that defendants acted with scienter[.]”  Id.  
The Funds attempt to distinguish Matrix Capital by 
highlighting that the defendant company there admitted to 
“incompetence” whereas Hertz admitted to an “inappropriate 
tone.”  We do not find that distinction meaningful.  Matrix’s 
reasoning is sound – an admission that a high-pressure 
management style existed in the past is not sufficient to meet 
the PSLRA’s scienter requirement without accompanying 
allegations of fraudulent intent. 
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defendant will not alone support” a securities fraud claim.  
Hayes v. Gross, 982 F.2d 104, 106 (3d Cir. 1992).  
Allegations of mismanagement will only support a securities 
fraud claim if they are coupled with allegations that the 
defendants were aware, or recklessly disregarded, that their 
mismanagement created an environment in which fraud was 
occurring.  See Webb, 884 F.3d at 856 (explaining that 
“allegations [that] paint a picture of a mismanaged 
organization in need of closer financial oversight” do not give 
rise to an inference of scienter absent a compelling inference 
that defendants knew they were committing a fraud when 
making the material misstatements or omissions); City of 
Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Waters 
Corp., 632 F.3d 751, 760 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Allegations of 
corporate mismanagement are not actionable under Rule 10b–
5.”); Hayes, 982 F.2d at 106 (explaining that allegations of 
mismanagement can support an inference of scienter if facts 
are alleged “that a defendant was aware that mismanagement 
had occurred and” lied about the existence of that 
mismanagement).  The FAC simply lacks sufficient 
allegations to compellingly imply that the Individual 
Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that their actions 
were resulting in improper accounting practices. 
 
 Accordingly, the Restatement’s admissions of material 
weaknesses in Hertz’s internal controls, including its 
admission of an “inappropriate tone at the top,” do not weigh 




  3. SOX Certifications Accompanying False 
   SEC Filings 
 
 An allegation that a defendant signed a SOX 
certification attesting to the accuracy of an SEC filing that 
turned out to be materially false does not add to the scienter 
puzzle in the absence of any allegation that the defendant 
knew he was signing a false SEC filing or recklessly 
disregarded inaccuracies contained in an SEC filing.  In re 
Zagg, Inc. Sec. Litig., 797 F.3d 1194, 1205 (10th Cir. 2015); 
Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1003-
04 (9th Cir. 2009).  As discussed above, the FAC fails to 
plead facts that could plausibly lead to such an inference. 
 
  4. Replacement of Upper Management 
 
 The Funds argue that the Individual Defendants’ 
resignations show scienter because they each resigned in 
close proximity to the public release of “bad news,” the 
Restatement blamed the accounting irregularities on an 
“inappropriate tone at the top,” and the Restatement explained 
that part of Hertz’s remedial measures included hiring a new 
senior management team.  We agree with the District Court, 
however, that the Individual Defendants’ resignations do not 
materially add to an inference of scienter because the FAC 
lacks allegations that those resignations were a result of the 
Individual Defendants’ involvement in a systemic fraud.   
 
 The departure of corporate executive defendants is a 
factor that can strengthen the inference of scienter.  See City 
of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Retirement Sys. v. 
Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d 605, 622 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(explaining that, in certain circumstances, “an employee’s 
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resignation supports an inference of scienter”); Brophy v. 
Jiangbo Pharm. Inc., 781 F.3d 1296, 1305 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(“Various courts have recognized that an executive officer’s 
resignation can strengthen an inference of scienter when it 
occurs around the same time as an investigation.”).  However, 
while resignations causally related to a restatement’s issuance 
can provide “evidence of the substantial accounting 
challenges [a] [c]ompany … faced, [they] do[] not compel an 
inference that [the individuals who resigned] were bent on 
committing fraud.”  Yates v. Mun. Mortg. & Equity, LLC, 744 
F.3d 874, 889 (4th Cir. 2014).  For a resignation to add to an 
inference of scienter, a pleading must set forth allegations 
suggesting a compelling inference that the resignation was the 
result of something other than “the reasonable assumption 
that the resignation occurred as a result of” the release of bad 
news.  Zucco Partners, 552 F.3d at 1002.  In other words, for 
corporate departures to strengthen an inference of scienter, 
there must be particularized allegations connecting the 
departures to the alleged fraud. 
 
 Here, Douglas’s resignation was announced just days 
before Hertz publicly released bad news stemming from the 
Company’s accounting problems, and Frissora’s and Kapur’s 
resignations were announced within about two months of 
Hertz releasing similar news.  Hertz freely acknowledged that 
it replaced executive- and management-level employees as a 
remedial measure to “change[] and enhance[] leadership in 
the business units associated with the restatement matters.”  
(App. at 611.)  As the District Court noted, the FAC’s 
allegations make clear that “the resignations … were causally 
related to the bad news” ultimately resulting in the 




 But pleading scienter requires more than pleading a 
link between bad news and an executive’s resignation.  
Changes in leadership are only to be expected when 
leadership fails.  That is not, in itself, a symbol of fraud.  
Corporate resignations do not strengthen an inference of 
scienter, when, as here, the allegations do not cogently 
suggest that the resignations resulted from the relevant 
executives’ knowing or reckless involvement in a fraud. 
 
  5. Insider Trading Activity 
 
 Demonstrating that a defendant had a motive, such as 
personal financial gain, to commit a securities fraud violation 
is a “relevant consideration” that “may weigh heavily in favor 
of a scienter inference[.]”  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 325; see also 
Rahman v. Kid Brands, Inc., 736 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(“Though it is not necessary to plead motive to establish that 
a defendant acted with scienter, its presence can be persuasive 
when concluding a holistic review of the evidence.”).  
Alleging insider trading is one way to plead motive.  In re 
Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 277 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  The mere fact that an insider sold corporate stock, 
however, is not enough to give rise to an inference of scienter.  
City of Edinburgh, 754 F.3d at 176; In re Suprema, 438 F.3d 
at 277. 
 
 Insider trading will strengthen an inference of scienter 
when the “sales of company stock by insiders … are ‘unusual 
in scope or timing[.]’”  In re Suprema, 438 F.3d at 277 
(citation omitted).  We have weighed a number of 
considerations when determining whether insider trading 
activity was “unusual in scope or timing,” including “the 
amount of profit made, the amount of stock traded, the 
22 
 
portion of stockholdings sold, … the number of insiders 
involved[, and] … whether the profits were substantial 
relative to the seller’s ordinary compensation.”  Id. (citations 
and quotation marks omitted).   
 
 Two considerations from the FAC’s insider trading 
allegations add to the inference of scienter.  First, the FAC 
alleges that both Douglas’s and Kapur’s insider trading 
activities were unusual when compared to their trading 
history.  For example, Douglas sold Hertz stock on four 
occasions during the class period but had not sold any Hertz 
stock in the three years prior to those trades.  Similarly, Kapur 
sold Hertz stock on five occasions during the class period but 
had only traded in Hertz stock one other time in the three 
preceding years.  Those allegations support an inference of 
scienter.  Id. at 278.  Second, the FAC alleges that Douglas 
earned a net profit of approximately $4 million on her insider 
trades, which exceeded her 2013 salary of $3 million.  
Although the FAC does not identify Kapur’s salary, it alleges 
that the approximately $3.1 million in profit he earned from 
his trading activities likely exceeded his annual 
compensation, given that he was Douglas’s subordinate.  
Compare id. (inferring scienter when profits from trading 
activities “nearly doubled in one day the total amount of 
money” a defendant had earned “over the previous three years 
combined”), with Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Integrated 
Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 553 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(concluding that inference of scienter not strengthened by 
allegation that insider stock sale netted a defendant a profit 
equivalent to 43% of that defendant’s salary). 
 
 Three other considerations, however, lessen the 
strength of the scienter inference to be drawn from the FAC’s 
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insider trading allegations.  First, the timing of the insider 
trades is not particularly suspicious.  Douglas and Kapur sold 
their shares when Hertz stock was trading between $21.23 
and $28.00, with the vast majority of sales occurring at a 
price at or below $26.14.  The overall class period high, in 
contrast, was $31.56 on August 19, 2014.  See Greebel v. 
FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 206 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(finding timing of insider trades to be not “very suspicious” 
because the insiders did not sell at “high points of the stock”).  
The allegations do not plausibly suggest that Douglas or 
Kapur timed their trades to improperly benefit from any 
particular disclosure.  The lack of any temporally suspicious 
trades weighs against inferring scienter from the trading 
activity.  See Yates, 744 F.3d at 890 (inference that trading 
activity was innocent strengthened by fact that “plaintiffs do 
not allege that the insiders timed the sales to take advantage 
of any particular disclosure”); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 
180 F.3d 525, 540 (3d Cir. 1999) (declining to infer scienter 
when insider trading took place three months before negative 
news publicly announced). 
 
 Second, the twenty-nine-month class period alleged by 
the Funds cautions against inferring scienter from the alleged 
insider trading.  “[A]lleging … a lengthy class period makes 
it difficult to infer intent from the mere fact of a stock sale, as 
it is not unusual for insiders to trade at some point during 
their tenure with a company.”  Yates, 744 F.3d at 891.  Courts 
have regularly concluded that an inference of scienter from 
insider trading is lessened when, as here, the class period is 
well over a year.  See id. (concluding that forty-four month 
period was “inordinately long” and weighed against inferring 
scienter); In re Vantive Corp. Sec. Litig., 283 F.3d 1079, 1092 
(9th Cir. 2002) (inference of scienter lessened due to 
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“unusually long class period of sixty-three weeks [fifteen 
months]”). 
 
 Third, the fact that the FAC named five individuals as 
defendants, but alleged insider trading only as to Douglas and 
Kapur, decreases the strength of the scienter inference.  See In 
re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 540 (explaining that a lack of insider 
trading allegations against a majority of insider defendants 
“rais[es] doubt [about] whether the sales were motivated by 
an intent to profit from inflated stock prices”).   
 
 A final consideration – the percentage of pre-class 
Hertz holdings Douglas and Kapur sold off during the class 
period – does not materially move the scienter needle.  
Douglas and Kapur sold off, respectively, 24.7% and 62.3% 
of their Hertz holdings.5  As a pure percentage of stock 
holdings sold, those percentages are supportive of an 
inference of scienter.  Compare In re Suprema, 438 F.3d at 
278 (inferring scienter, in part, because defendants sold off 
                                              
 5  Kapur contests the 62.3% figure by arguing that that 
figure includes the exercise of options that he never 
technically owned.  However, “[i]n calculating the percent of 
holdings sold, … it is appropriate to consider not only the 
shares of stock that [a defendant] held prior to [his] sales, but 
also the shares that [he] could have sold through the exercise 
of options[.]”  Waters Corp., 632 F.3d at 760; see also In re 
Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986-87 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (“Actual stock shares plus exercisable stock 
options represent the owner’s trading potential more 
accurately than the stock shares alone.”).  Accordingly, we 
accept the Funds’ allegation that Kapur sold 62.3% of his 
holdings for purposes of this motion to dismiss. 
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over 30% of holdings), with Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d at 279 (not 
inferring scienter when defendants sold 17% or less), and In 
re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 540-41 (same with regard to selling 
off of 5% to 7% of holdings).  But the pure percentage of 
holdings sold tells only part of the story.  Courts have 
routinely found that even large percentages of holdings sold 
at first blush appearing suspicious are not sufficient to infer 
scienter when other factors, such as the timing of the relevant 
sales, weigh against that inference.  See, e.g., Yates, 744 F.3d 
at 890-91 (selling 28% of holdings did not strengthen 
inference of scienter when not all defendants sold stock and 
the timing of the trades were not suspicious); Ronconi v. 
Larkin, 253 F.3d 423, 435 (9th Cir. 2001) (selling 69% of 
holdings did not strengthen inference of scienter when there 
was no allegation that the trades were timed to take advantage 
of alleged non-public information).  Here, as described above, 
the considerations weighing against inferring scienter limit 
the strength of the scienter inference that can be made from 
the percentage of pre-class holdings sold by Douglas and 
Kapur. 
 
 The FAC’s insider-trading allegations thus add only 
minimal weight to the inference of scienter.  
 
  6. Holistic Review 
 
 The Funds urge us to conclude that a holistic review of 
the FAC’s allegations leads only to one plausible string of 
inferences – that the Individual Defendants recklessly 
disregarded that their “tone” would lead lower-level 
employees to engage in inappropriate accounting to placate 
their demands, then recklessly disregarded that those 
irregularities would lead to overstated and inaccurate 
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financial statements, and, consequently, recklessly disclosed 
materially false information through SEC filings, press 
releases, and public announcements.  The problem the Funds 
face is that the inferences they propose are simply not as 
compelling as the opposing one drawn by the District Court: 
that corporate mismanagement resulted in accounting 
irregularities and, at most, negligent misstatements.   
 
 The FAC and Restatement make clear that the 
problems plaguing Hertz and its accounting department were 
significant, that Frissora and other members of senior 
management created a pressurized environment that 
contributed to those problems, and that those problems 
resulted in material misstatements regarding the Company’s 
financial condition.  But the allegations that the Individual 
Defendants resigned as Hertz discovered those problems, and 
that Douglas and Kapur sold portions of their Hertz stock 
holdings while those problems were ongoing, do not 
necessarily suggest that Hertz or its senior management were 
engaged in a systemic fraud.  More plausible is the suggestion 
that the Individual Defendants were just bad leaders.  The 
FAC’s allegations do not give rise to a cogent inference that 
the Individual Defendants were aware that their actions were 
improper, that they consciously disregarded that their “tone” 
was causing employees to engage in erroneous accounting, or 
that Hertz’s accounting errors were so obvious that only an 
attitude of reckless disregard on the part of the Individual 
Defendants can explain what they said and did.6 
                                              
 6  The Funds argue in the alternative that we should 
adopt the doctrine of corporate scienter to hold Hertz liable 
even if the FAC does not plead a strong inference of scienter 





 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of the FAC. 
                                                                                                     
a plaintiff “to plead an inference of scienter against a 
corporate defendant without raising the same inferences 
required to attribute scienter to an individual defendant.”  
Rahman, 736 F.3d at 246.  We have neither accepted nor 
rejected that doctrine and decline to do so here because the 
FAC’s allegations would not give rise to corporate scienter 
under any recognized theory of that doctrine.  See In re 
Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 473-77 (6th Cir. 
2014) (discussing different approaches to the doctrine of 
corporate scienter). 
 Furthermore, because we have affirmed the District 
Court’s dismissal of the FAC’s Section 10(b) claim, we need 
not address the Section 20(a) claim, which is dependent on a 
Section 10(b) violation.  City of Edinburgh, 754 F.3d at 177. 
